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INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITION
SAURAV ROYCHOUDHURY, ANUJ BHOWMIK, AND SROBONTI CHATTOPADHYAY
Abstract. We consider a two period career concern model where corporate
governance is a decisive factor for innovation efforts by a manager. In the
beginning of the first period, a manager decides whether to innovate. Prior to
the innovation decision, the ability of the manager is unknown to the firm but
known to the manager and an expected wage is paid based on a probability
distribution of managerial abilities. The success of the innovation is both a
function of the managerial ability and the product market competition and
the beliefs about the managerial ability is updated if the manager innovates
and the wage is set for the second period accordingly. Our model predicts
that the rate of innovation would be higher under a more democratic gover-
nance structure and relatively low product market competition. Using a panel
dataset from 1990s, compiled from Aghion et al.(2013b) and Gompers, Ishii,
and Metrick (2003), containing time-varying information of patent citations,
R&D, product market competition, and Governance index, we show that there
is a robust association between innovation and the quality of governance and
this relationship is strongest in industries with relatively low competition.
1. Introduction
Innovation activities in industries, especially oligopolistic industries, are com-
mon. Such activities often have different purposes, e.g. cost reduction for the
existing line of production, generating a better quality product,gain comparative
advantage, etc. All these, however, lead to the common objective : establishing
a competitive edge over competitors or maintaining own competitive strength in
order to do well in the industry. Therefore, many firms, in order to capture the
market better, be it in terms of lower costs leading to offering of lower prices or in
terms of better products, engages itself in innovation oriented R&D activities.
In a firm, the innovation decisions are largely taken by corporate managers.
These managers may enjoy higher benefits, e.g. in the form of promotions, higher
compensation, etc. following successful innovations. If an innovation succeeds,
a manager is generally assessed as one with high abilities. But the failure of an
innovation might result from these possibilities: either the manager has lower ability
or the manager did not put in enough effort or bad luck (noise). Unless there is
any provision for observing the managerial action or efforts actually put in by a
manager, no definite inference can be drawn about the exact cause of an innovation
failure.
If a firm has strong shareholder rights and minimal takeover defenses then a
manager could be risk-averse and may only select low return-low risk projects espe-
cially in presence of high competition. This might lead to under-investment in R&D
and innovation (Shlifer and Vishny, 1989). Corporate governance mechanisms such
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as fewer anti-takeover provisions, activist and institutional shareholders, or effec-
tive boards may reduce this moral hazard problem. However, the justification for
takeover threats (i.e. less anti-takeover provisions) is often seen as the strongest
form of managerial discipline (Jensen, 1986). Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)
have found that when managers are insulated from takeovers, they may exploit the
opportunity to avoid difficult and risky investments, especially if these could reveal
managers to be of low ability. As a result, the firm’s propensity to innovate may
be negatively associated with the level of takeover protection.
At the other extreme, there are firms where the shareholders have very few rights.
If there are stiff anti-takeover provisions, so that the firm is impregnable to outside
takeovers, it becomes difficult or costly to replace a manager. As a result, managers
may feel more secured and be willing to invest in long term risky projects (Stein,
1988). At the same time, with increased job security, managers may put in less
effort, shirk, extract private benefits (Jensen, 1986), or invest in inefficient projects
(Williamson, 1964; Masulis, et al., 2007) or even be content to lead a “quiet life”
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).
As noted widely in most literature on R&D, innovations are risky and there
is always some element of noise (luck) involved. In any governance structure, if
the manager does not innovate or make failed innovation attempts, she could be
removed from her position either by the board of directors, activist shareholders,
bankruptcy or takeover. With an autocratic governance structure with more man-
agerial power, it would be at least as difficult to “remove” a manager than if the
governance structure was more democratic. The “lazy manager hypothesis” (Hart,
1983) predicts that in industries with high product market competition, the gov-
ernance structure should not matter much as the manager is disciplined by the
threat of bankruptcy or takeover to work hard. Conversely, if the product market
competition is low then managers could shirk and content with living a “quiet life”.
Under any governance structure, managers know that failure in some innovation
activity or undertaking no innovation can be interpreted either as a lack of effort
on her part, or her low ability. In both the cases a manager knows that the threat
of removal is higher under democratic i.e. stronger governance structure. Since
the projection of higher ability entails a prospect of higher lifetime income, and a
successful innovation is generally interpreted as an indicator of high ability, every
manager has an incentive to project herself as a high ability manager.
We consider a two period career concern model where corporate governance is a
decisive factor for innovation efforts by a manager. Our model predicts that at any
given level of product market competition, the innovation efforts made by a manager
under a stronger or democratic governance structure (following Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (GIM, 2003) this would imply stronger shareholder rights, less anti-takeover
provisions and “less” entrenched managers) is not lower than innovation efforts
made under a weaker or autocratic governance structure (characterized by weak
shareholder rights, high number of anti-takeover provisions and “more” entrenched
managers). If the product market competition is low, the same manager will strictly
make more innovative efforts in a democratic democratic governance structure than
in an autocratic governance structure. Using an innovative dataset compiled by
Aghion et. al (2013b) and the G-index constructed by GIM, 2003, we find strong
empirical evidence supporting our claims. Our model provides support to the two
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widely used models of governance; the “lazy manager hypothesis” which posits that
the managers prefer a quietlife and with shareholders having more power will force
the managers to innovate, and the “career” concerns model where managers try to
avoid innovation due to concerns about their future earnings when the risk of failure
is high.
Homstro¨m (1999) analyzes the case where manager have career concerns – con-
cerns about the effects of current performance on future consumption.This impacts
her decision on making innovation efforts in her current job. In his model, the ex-
pected output in each period is a function of the assessed ability as calculated from
outputs observed in earlier periods. In that case, the manager might try to influence
the present performance and thus future income by involving unobserved actions.
The individual manager’s objective is to maximize returns to human capital, while
the firm’s objective is to maximize returns to financial capital. Depending on how
well these two kinds of capital are related, the career concerns of the managers
can be beneficial or detrimental to the firm. Aghion et al. (2013) uses this model
in a context where institutional ownership is associated with more innovation. In
their model, institutional owners, through reducing career risks of managers, can
increase innovation incentives. Empirically they find complementary relationships
between institutional ownership and product market competition in deciding the
level of innovation.
Our model, though shares some common features with both these papers, marks
a departure in analysis in certain ways. First, we consider ability to be private
information to the managers, unknown to the employers initially, only revealed
through observed performances over time, as opposed to the assumption that ability
of managers is unknown to both, the managers as well as the firms. Second, we
introduce governance as a decisive factor regarding innovation effort levels in the
scenario. In low competition, the higher probability of success of an innovation
effort reduces the reputational risk attached with undertaking a risky investment
under any governance structure. But as the manager’s will have a less ability to
slack when the governance is strong than when the governance is weak, our model
predicts strictly more innovation associated with stronger governance. In presence
of high competition, the manger has less ability to slack under any governance
structure, though we would still that the governance structure still matters where
manager’s under a democratic governance structure do not make any less innovation
efforts than the manager’s under relatively autocratic governance structure.
There have been few empirical papers which directly deal with the broad based
governance index and innovation and so far the empirical evidence has been mixed.
Roychoudhury and Egorov (2009) find a negative relationship between innovation
and the GIMs G-Index from 1990-2004 for US firms, where higher values of the G-
index imply higher anti-takeover provisions and more restrictive shareholder rights.
They measure corporate innovation as firm level total factor productivity estimated
from a modified Solow (1956) model. Becker-Blease (2011) found a positive rela-
tionship between proxies of innovation (using R&D expenditures and Patent data)
and his reconstructed G-Index over 1984 and 1997. Sapra et al. (2014) show that
there is a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure,
which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private
benefits of control. They find that innovation is fostered either by an unhindered
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market for corporate control, or by anti-takeover laws that are severe enough to
effectively deter takeovers. We contribute to this discussion by showing that there
is a negative association between the G-Index and innovations (as measured by
future cite weighted patents) but for firms which are characterized by industries
with relatively low product market completion.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our model,
Section 3 shows the main results from the model, Section 4 describes the data,
Section 5 reports and analyzes our empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Description of the model
We consider a two period career concern model similar to that in Homstro¨m(1999)
and Aghion et al.(2013). Our model involves two sectors1, denoted by S = {S1, S2}.
A firm in sector S1 is run by our representative manager whose ability is unknown
to the market and also to the concerned manager. We denote the set of abilities
by Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, where θ3  θ2  θ1 and θi  θj indicate that the type θi is
higher than the type θj . In the first period, she decides whether to innovate. Note
that the outcome of an innovative activity may either be a success or a failure. The
income of the manager is determined by a function2 f : Θ→ R+, where
f(θ3) ≥ f(θ2) ≥ f(θ1) and f(θ3) > f(θ1).
Note that we allow the manager with the intermediate ability θ2 to have the same
income as that of the manager with either high or low ability3. Denoting the revenue
realizations of an innovation by {0, 1}, where 0 (respectively 1) indicates the failure
(respectively success) of an innovation, the set of states is defined by
Ω := Θ× {0, 1} = {(θi, j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, j = 0, 1}.
It is assumed that θi and j are unknown in the first period to both the market
as well as the managers. However, the realization of j will be observable in the
second period. But the same is not true for θi. Normalizing (ex post) perfect
competition in the market to 1, the degrees of competition are denoted by (0, 1].
Since the revenue realizations depend on the managerial ability and the market
competition, the probability of occurrence of an outcome of Ω also depends on the
market competition. Let (Ω,F ,Pc) be a probability space of states, where F is
the algebra generated by all subsets of Ω representing the family of all events and
Pc is a probability measure for any competition level c ∈ (0, 1]. We assume that
Pc(θi) = 13 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Thus, the managerial abilities are equally likely in the
first period.
For a given degree of competition c, let Pc(1|θi) = pi(c). This means that
for a given type θi and a competition level c, the probability of success of an
innovation is pi(c). Consequently, for a given type θi and a competition level c, the
probability of failure of an innovation is given by Pc(0|θi) = 1 − pi(c). Note that
1For simplicity, we assume only two sectors in our model. Allowing multiple sectors of any
number in our model does not change our analysis.
2Note that the income of the manager is sector-specific, that is, the income of the manager in
S1 and S2 are determined by possibly different functions.
3This is very natural if one considers many different types of abilities. For simplicity, we
consider three types of abilities in our model. A general model containing m(≥ 2) many types of
abilities is studied in the appendix.
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pi : (0, 1] → [0, 1] is a monotonically decreasing function for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, that is,
the success of an innovation goes higher with lower degrees of competition. This is
a common prediction shared by models of endogeneous growth (e.g,, Romer, 1990
and Grossman and Helpman, 1991), where product market competition is modeled
as a probability of imitation, in which an increase in imitation probability will
reduce the monopoly rents that reward new innovation. This also has support from
the IO models of Salop (1977) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) which suggest that
higher competition will reduce postentry rents. Note, our model predicts that the
number of innovations under low product market competition will unambiguously
be no lower than that under high competition.
Since abilities are directly related to the result of an innovation, let p3 > p2 > p1
4.
This means that the higher the ability, the higher is the chance to get the successful
innovation for any competition level. Using the formula of conditional probability,
one has
Pc(θi, 1) = Pc(1|θi)Pc(θi) = pi(c)
3
and Pc(θi, 0) = Pc(0|θi)Pc(θi) = 1− pi(c)
3
.
Since there is an uncertainty regarding the managerial ability, the probabilities of
success and failure of an innovation are given by
Pc(1) =
3∑
i=1
Pc(θi, 1) =
1
3
3∑
i=1
pi(c) and Pc(0) = 1− 1
3
3∑
i=1
pi(c),
respectively. We use the following assumptions in our model.
(A1) The markets for managers are fully competitive and the second period
income is equal to the value of the income function conditional upon the
information acquired in the first period;
(A2) Managerial ability is sector-specific in the sense that the information of
the current job is uncorrelated with the manager’s ability if she moves to
another sector.
(A3) The value p3(c) is very close to 1 when c is very close to 0. Suppose also
that p2(c0) >
1
2 and p1(c0) 6= 0 for some c0 ∈ (0, 1].
It is worth pointing out that (A1) and (A2) are similar to Assumption 1 and
Assumption 3, respectively, in Aghion et al. (2013). Assumption (A3) will be
used to show that the success of innovation is higher at a lower product market
competition.
In general, most of a manager’s payoff is determined not by explicit contracts,
but the effect her reputation has on her ability to renegotiate her contract (see Xu,
2013 and Aghion et al., 2013). In our model, there are no explicit output contingent
contracts, but since manager’s income in each period is based on expected output
and expected output depends on assessed ability, an implicit contract links her
first period performance to her second period income. If the manager takes an
innovation decision, then the market updates belief about the manager’s ability
from observing the first period’s revenue realizations. Thus, given a successful
innovation, the probability of type θi is given by
Pc(θi|1) = Pc(θi, 1)Pc(1) =
pi(c)∑3
i=1 pi(c)
.
4The ordering is taken pointwise, that is, p3(c) > p2(c) > p1(c) for all c ∈ (0, 1].
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Similarly, given failure of an innovation, the probability of type θi is given by
Pc(θi|0) = Pc(θi, 0)Pc(0) =
1− pi(c)
3−∑3i=1 pi(c) .
So, Pc(θi|1) and Pc(θi|0) are market’s belief in the second period about the man-
ager’s ability θi whenever the first period revenue realizations are 1 and 0, respec-
tively. Since p3(c) > p2(c) > p1(c), one obtains
Pc(θ3|1) > Pc(θ2|1) > Pc(θ1|1) and Pc(θ3|0) < Pc(θ2|0) < Pc(θ1|0).
As a result, a successful (failed) innovation leads to a belief that assigns higher
probability to the high (low) managerial ability. Thus, we assume that the man-
ager is not removed from S1 at the beginning of the second period if the revenue
realization in the first period is 1. Consequently, for successful innovation in the
first period, the manager’s income5 in the second period if she remains in S1 is
EPc(·|1)(f) =
3∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi|1) =
∑3
i=1 f(θi)pi(c)∑3
i=1 pi(c)
.
The role of governance can be justified if the first period revenue realization is 0
or the manager decides not to make an innovation effort. In both these situations,
there are possibilities that the manager would be removed from S1. In case that
the first period revenue realization is 0 and the manager retains the same job, her
income in the second period will be
EPc(·|0)(f) =
3∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi|0) =
∑3
i=1 f(θi)(1− pi(c))
3−∑3i=1 pi(c) .
If the manager decides not to innovate in the first period, then no information is
revealed about the manager’s ability. Consequently, if she remains in S1 in the
second period, then her income will be
EPc(f) =
3∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi) =
1
3
3∑
i=1
f(θi).
For a proof of the following theorem, refer to the proof of Theorem 6.1 for m(≥ 2)
many abilities in the Appendix.
Theorem 2.1. EPc(·|1)(f) > EPc(f) > EPc(·|0)(f).
It is assumed that relocation of the manager to another sector incurs a switching
cost δ satisfying
EPc(·|1)(f) > EPc(f)− δ > EPc(·|0)(f).(2.1)
It follows from (A2) that the information about the current job is uncorrelated with
the manager’s ability if she moves to S2. Thus, she has a new draw of distribution
of talent in S2 and the income of the manager in S2 in the second period is EPc(g)
for some income function g : Θ → R+. The above inequality says that the value
δ := EPc(f)−EPc(g) is small enough so that the income of the manager in S2 is no
better than EPc(·|1)(f) and worse than EPc(·|0)(f), refer to Aghion et. al. (2013).
5Here, we use the standard notation of expectation, that is, for the random variable f : Θ→ R+
and the probability measure Pc(·|1) : Θ → [0, 1], the expression EPc(·|1)(f) denotes the expected
value.
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We now introduce governance into the model. The innovation decision in the
first period is denoted by i ∈ {0, 1}, where i = 0 means no innovation effort and
i = 1 means an innovation effort. Following GIM (2003), we define two types of
governance structures: the autocratic or dictatorial governance structure, where the
firm has high takeover provisions and weak shareholder rights and the democratic
governance, where there are fewer anti-takeover provisions and shareholders have
more power. We take a convention that each governance structure wants to keep
a manager whose ability is higher than some threshold value of types and the
threshold value in the case of democratic governance structure is not lower than
that in the case of autocratic governance structure. Suppose, ga stands for the
autocratic governance and gd represents the democratic governance. Let qa and qd
represent the probabilities of removing from S1 for failure of an innovation under
the autocratic governance and the democratic governance, respectively. If there is
no innovation effort, ra and rd denote the probabilities of removing a manager from
S1 when the governance structures are autocratic and democratic, respectively. We
introduce two other assumptions to our model.
(A4) Under the democratic governance regime, if the innovation fails, then the
probability, qd, of the manager getting removed is not less than the prob-
ability, qa, of getting removed under the autocratic regime, i.e., qd ≥ qa;
(A5) If the manager decides not to innovate, the probability of being removed
is higher in the democratic governance regime, i.e., rd > ra.
This information is known to the manager. Since removal from S1 is uncertain, the
ex-ante expected income of the manager for the second period is probabilistic. The
notation E(W (i = 0, g = gk)) is employed to represent the ex ante income of the
manager in the second period for the case of no innovation in the first period and the
governance structure gk for k = a, d. Analogously, the symbol E(W (i = 1, g = gk))
is used to denote the ex ante income of the manager in the second period when she
takes an innovation decision in the first period and the governance structure is gk
for k = a, d. Thus, under the governance structure gk, the manager decides to take
an innovation decision if and only if
E(W (i = 1, g = gk))− I > E(W (i = 0, g = gk)),
where I is the innovation cost.
3. The Main Result
In this section, we show that the number of an innovation decision is higher
under the democratic governance and lower market competition.
To establish that number of innovation decisions increases if the market compe-
tition decreases, note from (2.1) that the manager is willing to take an innovation
decision whenever she has some hope for the success of an innovation decision.
Given (A3), we can assume that
∑3
i=1 pi(c∗) >
3
2 for some c∗ ∈ (0, 1] satisfying
c∗ ≤ c0. Consequently, Pc∗(1) > 12 . Note that the value Pc(1) becomes larger as c
becomes smaller. Thus, Pc∗(1) > 12 for all c ∈ (0, c∗]. So, if the manager takes an
innovation decision in some point c1 ∈ (0, c∗] then she must take the innovation de-
cision at any point c ∈ (0, c1]. Hence, the number of innovation decisions is higher
with respect to lower competition.
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Now, we show that the number of an innovation decision under the democratic
governance is not lower than that under the autocratic governance. Formally, we
prove that
E(W (i = 1, g = ga))− I > E(W (i = 0, g = ga))
⇒ E(W (i = 1, g = gd))− I > E(W (i = 0, g = gd)).
This means that if the manager takes an innovation decision under the autocratic
governance structure then she must take an innovation decision under the demo-
cratic governance structure.
3.1. The Case When δ ≥ 0. If the manager does not take an innovation decision
then her income will be high in S1 than that in S2 since EPc(f) ≥ EPc(g) for δ ≥ 0.
In this case, either she will retain her job in S1 or she will be removed from S1
in the second period. In that event, she will join S2. Recall that the probability
of retaining the same job in S1 is 1 − rk and that of being removed from S1 is rk
whenever the governance structure is gk. So, the ex ante expected income of the
manager conditional upon not taking an innovation decision is
E(W (i = 0, g = gk)) = rkEPc(g) + (1− rk)EPc(f) = EPc(f)− rkδ.
We now consider the situation when the manager takes an innovation decision. It
follows from (2.1) that the failure of an innovation results in the manager’s higher
income from joining S2 than that if she retains the same job in S1 in the second
period. However, she might have some incentive to stay in S1 if the difference
between these two incomes is sufficiently small. Consider now the possibility when
the manager is willing to switch to S2 for the failure of an innovation. In this
situation, she will get the wage EP(·|1)(f) for successful innovation and the wage
EP(g) for the failure of innovation. Thus, her ex ante expected income6 is
E(W (i = 1, g = gk)) = Pc(1)EPc(·|1)(f) + Pc(0)EPc(g)
for k = a, d. We now take the possibility when the manager is willing to stay
in S1. However, this decision depends not only on her, but it also depends on
the governance structure. Since the probability of removal from S1 is qk for the
governance structure gk, her ex ante expected income is
E(W (i = 1, g = gk)) = Pc(1)EPc(·|1)(f) + Pc(0)
(
qkEPc(g) + (1− qk)EPc(·|0)(f)
)
for k = a, d. Consequently, for both of these possibilities, one obtains
E(W (i = 1, g = gd)) ≥ E(W (i = 1, g = ga)).
Note that
E(W (i = 0, g = gd)) ≤ E(W (i = 0, g = ga)).
So,
E(W (i = 1, g = ga))− I > E(W (i = 0, g = ga))
⇒ E(W (i = 1, g = gd))− I > E(W (i = 0, g = gd)).
Hence, the number of innovation efforts under the democratic governance is not
lower than that under the autocratic governance.
6Note that this possibility does not depend on the governance structure, and the ex ante
expected income is same across two governance structures.
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3.2. The Case When δ < 0. In this case, the manager’s income for no innovation
decision is higher7 in S2 than S1. Thus, if the manager moves to S2 in the second
period then her income will be E(W (i = 0, g = gk)) = EPc(g). However, if the
switching is small then she might have some incentive to stay in the same sector.
Since this decision depends on her as well as on the governance, her ex ante expected
income is
E(W (i = 0, g = gk)) = rkEPc(g) + (1− rk)EPc(f) = EPc(f)− rkδ.
Note that for the failure of innovation, manager must move to S2 as the wage EPc(g)
is sufficiently higher than EPc(·|0)(f). Thus, the manager’s ex ante expected income
for an innovation decision is
E(W (i = 1, g = gk)) = Pc(1)EPc(·|1)(f) + Pc(0)EPc(g)
for k = a, d. Since EPc(·|1)(f) > E(W (i = 0, g = gk)) and EPc(g) ≥ E(W (i = 0, g =
gk)) irrespective of the fact that whether the manager will retain her job or move
to S2, one has
E(W (i = 1, g = gk)) > E(W (i = 0, g = gk))
for k = a, d. Thus, for δ < 0, the manager always takes an innovation decision in
both the governance structure.
4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Governance Data. GIM’s ‘G-Index’ is possibly the most widely used broad
based measure of corporate governance in the US. It is a proxy for the balance
of power between shareholders and managers. It was created on the basis of how
many restrictive governance provisions are imposed on shareholder rights; the more
restrictive the governance, the weaker the shareholder rights. These anti-takeover
provisions range from bylaws that restrict shareholder voting to whether companies
are subject to state-level anti-takeover laws. Their primary data source is the In-
vestor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The governance index is constructed
by adding one point for every provision(out of a total of 24) that restricts share-
holder rights and correspondingly increases managerial power; thus, the higher the
score, the weaker the shareholder rights.The firms with weak shareholder rights (or
higher G-index)are more likely to experience a wider divergence of ownership and
control.Additionally, such firms are also more likely to have high agency costs and
hence, poor corporate governance. Since the IRRC does not publish volumes for
every year, Aghion et al. (2013b) dataset does not include G-index values for years
where the IRRC data was missing. We fill the missing years assuming that the
governance provisions reported in any given year were also in place in two years
preceding the volume’s publication. This procedure is consistent with all the major
studies involving the G-index(e.g., Fishman et al. (2014).
4.2. Innovation. Following standard literature on proxies of innovation, we mea-
sure innovation by future cite weighted patents following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2005)and Aghion et. al (2013). The patent related data is obtained from Aghion
et al. (2013b). They obtain patents data from the NBER and match them with the
USPTO data for patents that were ultimately granted, dated by year of application
7This does not mean that the manager’s income for successful innovation is higher in S2 than
S1. For instance, f(θ3) > g(θ3), f(θ2) = g(θ2), f(θ1) < g(θ1) and f(θ1) + f(θ3) = g(θ1) + g(θ3)
imply EPc (g) > EPc (f) and EPc(·|1)(g) < EPc(·|1)(f).
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from 1963 to 1999. Since the value of these patents differs greatly, to capture their
importance they weight them by the number of future citations between 1975 and
2002. To deal with censoring they estimate only until 1999, allowing for a three-
year window of future citations for the last cohort of patents in the data. They also
include a full set of time dummies, which controls for the fact that patents taken
out later in the panel have less time to be cited than patents taken out earlier in
the panel.
4.3. Firm Specific Accounting Data. The capital and labor data is obtained
from Aghion et al. (2013) data set and cross-checked with the COMPUSTAT data.
The capital stock of a firm is measured by the Net Property, Plant, and Equipment
(PPEN, COMPUSTAT industrial annual data item 8).The book value of total assets
is used to account for the size factor (ASSETS, COMPUSTATindustrial annual
data item 6). The capital stock in a firm is difficult to measure with time series of
investments required along with composition issues. However, Bailey, et al., (1992),
find that in the productivity model, the use of sophisticated measures of capital
instead of crude measures based on book values of capital stock do not change the
results qualitatively. For labor input, there is no way to distinguish between ”blue
collar” and ”white collar” workers and hence the labor input is simply the number
of its employees (EMP, COMPUSTAT industrial annual data item 29). We use the
R&D stock available in Aghion et. al. (2013b) dataset which is estimated using a
perpetual inventory method described by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005).
4.4. Competition. Following Aghion et. al (2013), we employ the inverse Lerner
(i.e., 1- Lerner index) as a measure of the intensity of competition. Consistent with
our theoretical model, a value close to 1 implies perfect competition. Lerner is
estimated as the median gross margin from entire Compustat database in the firms
three-digit industry. There is some (weak) evidence of an inverted U relationship
between innovation and competition. If we run a regression of Innovation on the
inverse Lerner and the square of the inverse Lerner, the linear term is positive
whereas the squared term is negative but insignificant. See Aghion et al. (2005)
for a discussion on why the inverse Lerner is appropriate in these kinds of models.
4.5. Descriptive Statistics. By restricting the Aghion et al. (2013b) dataset to
firms which have a G-index value associated with them, our baseline sample reduces
to 285 firms, 1669 firm years spanning a period from 1990-1999. We consider a range
of control variables suggested by the existing literature. For example, we condition
on Sales, R&D stock and the capital-labor ratio (Aghion et al., 2013, Hall, Jaffe,
and Trajtenberg, 2005, and Gompers and Metrick, 2001). In all our regressions
we account for the full set of four digit industry and time dummies. As different
industries are likely to have different observed levels of patenting activity due to
institutional features of the industry that may have no direct link with product
market competition or governance, it is imperative to use industry fixed effects in
all our regressions. The time effects control for common macroeconomic shocks.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our regressions.
The firms in our sample are large with mean (and median) sales of little more than
1.6 billion dollars. Our sample of firms spend, on average, about 275 million on
R&D per year. The patent series is highly skewed with a mean of about 55, standard
deviation of 159 and a median of 10 patent counts. The corresponding numbers for
forward citations shows an even larger skew with a mean of 410, standard deviation
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of 1494 and a median of 52 cite-weighted patents. The G-index has a median value
of 10 and a mean value of 10.1 with a standard deviation of 2.7. The proxy for
competition as measured by the inverse Lerner index has a mean of 0.86 and a
median of 0.871.
5. Results and Analysis
It is worthwhile to look at the relationship between our proxies for innovation
and governance. Figure 1 shows the non-parametric relationship between log of
raw patent counts and the G-index using a locally weighted regression estimated
by lowess smoother8 (with a bandwith of 0.8). Figure 2 replaces log patent counts
with the Log of future citation-weighted patents measure. For both figures, there
is a negative relationship between innovation and the Governance Index as shown
by the shape of the fitted curve. The curve becomes steeper at higher levels of
the G-index implying this negative association is stronger at higher levels of the
G-index.
Our base parametric model is the Poisson regression model because of the count-
based nature of the dependent variable. The Poisson distribution is entirely deter-
mined by its mean, so we only need to specify E(y|x) in order to estimate the effect
of explanatory variables on our dependent variable. As we are primarily interested
in the effect of G-Index on yjt (i.e., future cite-weighted patents of firm j in period
t), we will specify the conditional expectation of yjt as
8Lowess is an acronym for “Locally weighted Scatter plot Smoother. The smoothing process
is considered local because each smoothed value is determined by neighboring data points defined
within the span. A regression weight function is defined for the data points contained within the
span.
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E(yjt|xjt, γjt) = e(αGjt+βxjt+γjt),(5.1)
where xjt are other control variables, and γjt represents a complete set of time and
four digit industry dummies. We also consider negative binomial model which re-
laxes the assumption in Poisson that the conditional mean and variance are equal.
As all these models allow the standard errors to have arbitrary heteroskedacity
and autocorrelation (e.g., clustering the standard errors by firm), the exact func-
tional form of the error distribution is not so important (Aghion et al., 2013).
We also adopt the log-link formulation because of the count based nature of the
dependent variable. Table 2 reports the baseline results. Columns (1)-(3) from Ta-
ble 2 presents the estimates from the Poisson count data regressions of future-cite
weighted patents on the G-index with controls for capital, labor, sales,four digit
industry dummies and year dummies (column 1), additional controls of R&D stock
(column 2) and institutional ownership (column 3). Across columns (1) and (3),
the coefficient on the G-index is negative and significant with a magnitude of about
-0.08. A coefficient of -0.08 implies that an increase of 1 standard deviation in
the G-index (about 2.7 points) is associated with a 21.6 percent decrease in the
probability of obtaining an additional cite-weighted patent. The coefficient on the
firms R&D stock (columns 2 and 3) and the institutional ownership(column 3) is
positive but insignificant. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 repeat the specifications of
the first three columns but use the more general Negative Binomial model. Across
columns (4)-(6), the coefficient on the G-Index is negative and significant. The
coefficient on the R&D stock is positive and significant and reduces the coefficient
on the G-Index from -0.067 to -0.054. The coefficient on institutional ownership
however remains insignificant.
A major problem faced while creating an empirical model for governance studies
is endogeneity. The variables that represent levels of corporate governance may
be also determined simultaneously with dependent variables related to innovation
activity. Firms with better and worse governance probably also differ on other,
unobserved, dimensions. So comparing managerial behavior between firms with
autocratic and democratic governance may capture the effect of these unobservable
differences rather than the effect of governance. Similarly, changes in governance
within a firm may be accompanied by other unobservable changes. The simultane-
ous equations bias makes it difficult to determine the direction of causality. The
problem of simultaneous equation bias could be empirically treated by the use of
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an instrumental variables or the Arellano-Bond (1991) approach, but such an in-
strument for G-index is not easily identified. GIM (2003) report their inability to
come up with a suitable instrument for G-index to use as an instrumental variable.
Another way of reducing this endogeneity problem is the use of panel data fixed
effect models. A combined time and firm fixed effect regression model eliminates
omitted variables arising both from unobserved variables that are constant over
time and unobserved variables that are constant across firms. With firm fixed ef-
fects, the regression coefficient on the G-index is driven by the extent of variation
over time within each firm. Since the G-index for a firm is largely invariant over
time, the fixed effects regression coefficient on the G-index is mostly attributed to
the variation of G-index of the firms for which the index values does change over
time. If a firms governance is sticky over time, that firm would not contribute to
the coefficient estimation but will only introduce noise and lower test power (Chi,
2005).
An alternative solution to implement fixed effects suggested by Blundell, Griffith,
and Van Reenen (1999) is to use the pre-sample mean scaling method in such models
involving count data. Aghion et. al (2013) uses a long history on patenting behavior
(up to 25 years per firm) to construct the pre-sample mean of cite-weighted patents
for each firm. This can then be used as an initial condition to proxy for unobserved
heterogeneity under certain conditions. We use Aghion et. al (2013) dataset to
obtain the pre-sampled and scaled means of cite weighted patents and raw patents
for each firm.
To incorporate the effect of governance and competition on innovation we split
our sample into observations with high and low competition based on the median
(0.871) of the inverse Lerner index. Including the firm fixed effects and competition
into our baseline Poisson model, we estimate
14 S. ROYCHOUDHURY, A. BHOWMIK, AND S. CHATTOPADHYAY
E(yjt|xjt, cj , µj , γjt) = e(αGjt+βxjt+cj+µj+γjt),(5.2)
where xjt are other control variables, cj is our measure of competition based on 3
digit industry for firm j, µj is a firm fixed effect, and γjt represents a complete set
of time and industry dummies.
Table 3 reports Poisson count data regressions of future cite-weighted patents
on the G-index accounting for product market competition (as measured by 1-
Lerner) and the usual controls. Column (1) and (2) report estimates adding the
Competition variable to our baseline regression which include usual set of controls
and the R&D stock. The coefficient on G-Index in Column (1) of table 3 is negative
and significant at 1% with a value of -0.084. However, including fixed effects using
the pre-sample mean scaling estimator in Column (2) brings the coefficient on theG-
index down to -0.026 but still significant but at the 10% level. A coefficient of -0.026
implies that an increase of 1 standard deviation in the G-index (about 2.7 points)
is associated with a 7 percent decrease in the probability of obtaining an additional
cite-weighted patent (e.g., from the mean of 410 cite weighted patents to about
380)for a given level of competition. The coefficient on competition is positive as
expected but insignificant in (1) and (2). In Column (3) and (4) where competition
is high, the coefficient on the G-index is still negative but now insignificant while
the coefficient on competition becomes positive and highly significant. For low
competition (columns (5) and (6)), the coefficient on the G-index is negative and
highly significant for both the non-fixed and fixed effects model specifications. The
magnitude of the coefficient on the G-index in presence of low competition is larger
than the corresponding values for high competition. However, the coefficient on
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competition, though positive, is insignificant for the low competition firms. The
results from table 3 imply that the relationship between governance and innovation
is strongest in industries with relatively low competition. In the columns where
we include fixed effects, the coefficient on the R&D stock and ln(Sales) drops
significantly. This could be due to the fact that both these variables will have very
little within-firm variation hence their effects are muted.
Aghion et al.(2013) as a robustness exercise use unweighted patent counts as a
dependent variable.We use the raw patent count from their dataset and repeat the
some of the specifications used in Tables 2 and 3. We include firm fixed effects
using the pre-sample mean scaling estimator based on raw patents. Table 4 reports
the results. Column (1) and Column (2) shows the baseline regression with the
usual controls. The results for columns (3)-(6)where we include competition are
qualitatively similar to the corresponding columns in Table 39.
6. Conclusions
One possible explanation for the variation in innovations across firms in similar
industries can be found in terms of the relationship between the type of governance
structure and the extent of innovative activities. Our paper has made an attempt
to explore this relationship with a simple theoretical model as well as an empiri-
cal investigation. The model provides support to the two widely used models of
governance; the “lazy manager hypothesis” which posits that the managers prefer
9We also ran Poisson regressions with additional controls such as Tobin’s q as well as used OLS
(we used natural log of future cite weighted patents as the dependent variable)in base regressions.
Our main results and significance remained unchanged. We do not report the results for brevity
but they can be obtained from the author’s upon request.
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a quiet life and with shareholders having more power will force the managers to
to innovate, and the “career concerns model” where managers try to avoid inno-
vation due to concerns about their future earnings when the risk of failure is high
such as in high competition. Our model predicts that corporate governance is a
decisive factor for innovation efforts by a manager especially in industries where
product market competition in low. This is possibly because highly competitive
industries preclude the need for additional monitoring provided by the governance
as the manager is disciplined by the threat of bankruptcy or take-over to work
hard. Our empirical results strongly support most of our model’s predictions. The
relationship between the G-index and innovation is robust when firms belong to
relatively less competitive industries. However, we find only weak evidence of this
managerial behavior in highly competitive industries.
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APPENDIX
We consider a general model where the set of managerial abilities containing
m(≥ 2) many elements, denoted by Θ = {θ1, · · · , θm}. Put,
Ω := Θ× {0, 1} = {(θi, j) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m, j = 0, 1},
where θm  · · ·  θ1. As in Section 2, let (Ω,F ,Pc) be a probability space and
Pc(θi) = 1m for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus,
Pc(θi, 1) = Pc(1|θi)Pc(θi) = pi(c)
m
and Pc(θi, 0) = Pc(0|θi)Pc(θi) = 1− pi(c)
m
.
Assume that f : θ → R+ denote the income function of the manager in S1 such
that
f(θm) ≥ · · · ≥ f(θ1) and f(θm) > f(θ1).
Consequently, the probabilities of success and failure of an innovation are given by
Pc(1) =
m∑
i=1
Pc(θi, 1) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
pi(c) and Pc(0) = 1− 1
m
m∑
i=1
pi(c),
respectively. Hence,
Pc(θi|1) = Pc(θi, 1)Pc(1) =
pi(c)∑m
i=1 pi(c)
and Pc(θi|0) = Pc(θi, 0)Pc(0) =
1− pi(c)
m−∑mi=1 pi(c) .
Manager’s income in the second period in S1 for success and failure of innovation
in the first period are
EPc(·|1)(f) =
m∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi|1) =
∑m
i=1 f(θi)pi(c)∑m
i=1 pi(c)
and
EPc(·|0)(f) =
m∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi|0) =
∑m
i=1 f(θi)(1− pi(c))
m−∑mi=1 pi(c) .
Her income in the second period in S1 for no innovation effort is given by
EPc(f) =
m∑
i=1
f(θi)Pc(θi) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
f(θi).
We now present the relationship among the above three income levels.
Theorem 6.1. EPc(·|1)(f) > EPc(f) > EPc(·|0)(f).
Proof. Obviously,
EPc(·|1)(f) > EPc(f)⇔ m
m∑
i=1
f(θi)pi(c) >
m∑
i=1
f(θi)
m∑
i=1
pi(c)
and
EPc(f) > EPc(·|0)(f)⇔ m
m∑
i=1
f(θi)pi(c) >
m∑
i=1
f(θi)
m∑
i=1
pi(c).
Thus, it only remains to prove that
m
m∑
i=1
f(θi)pi(c) >
m∑
i=1
f(θi)
m∑
i=1
pi(c).(6.1)
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We prove the inequality (6.1) by mathematical induction. If m = 2 then f(θ2) >
f(θ1). Using (p2(c)− p1(c))(f(θ2)− f(θ1)) > 0, it can be verified that
2
2∑
i=1
f(θi)pi(c) >
2∑
i=1
f(θi)
2∑
i=1
pi(c).
Thus, (6.1) is true for m = 2. Assume that (6.1) holds for m = k ≥ 2. We now
show that it is true for m = k + 1. Since f(θk+1) > f(θ1), at least one of the
inequalities in f(θk+1) ≥ · · · ≥ f(θ1) must be strict. Let 1 ≤ k0 ≤ k be the largest
integer such that f(θk0+1) > f(θk0). The rest of the proof is decomposed into two
cases.
Case 1. k0 = k. Then
k+1∑
i=1
f(θi)
k+1∑
i=1
pi(c) =
(
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi) + f(θ1)
)(
k+1∑
i=2
pi(c) + p1(c)
)
By induction hypothesis, since f(θk+1) > f(θ2), one has
k
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi)pi(c) >
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi)
k+1∑
i=2
pi(c).
Since f(θ1) ≤ f(θi) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, one concludes
k+1∑
i=2
(pi(c)− p1(c))f(θ1) ≤
k+1∑
i=2
(pi(c)− p1(c))f(θi).
This implies that
f(θ1)
k+1∑
i=2
pi(c) + p1(c)
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi) ≤
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi)pi(c) + kf(θ1)p1(c).
Thus,
k+1∑
i=1
f(θi)
k+1∑
i=1
pi(c) < (k + 1)
k+1∑
i=2
f(θi)pi(c) + (k + 1)f(θ1)p1(c).
Hence,
k+1∑
i=1
f(θi)
k+1∑
i=1
pi(c) < (k + 1)
k+1∑
i=1
f(θi)pi(c)
and thus, (6.1) is true for m = k + 1.
Case 2. k0 6= k. Applying an argument similar to that in Case 1 with the fact
that f(θk) > f(θ1), f(θk+1) ≥ f(θi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
k+1∑
i=1
f(θi)
k+1∑
i=1
pi(c) =
(
k∑
i=1
f(θi) + f(θk+1)
)(
k∑
i=1
pi(c) + pk+1(c)
)
,
one can verify that (6.1) is true for m = k + 1.
By the principle of mathematical induction, it follows from Case 1 and Case 2
that (6.1) holds for all integer m ≥ 2. 
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Analogous to our main result, it can be shown that for a model with m(≥ 2)
many abilities, the number of innovation decisions is high under the democratic
governance structure and lower market competition.
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